A Borderline Case: The Establishment
Clause Implications of Religious Questioning
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Allison Hugi†
Does a border agent violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution when
he questions an individual about that person’s religious beliefs? The answer is
unclear. The analysis that should be undertaken to reach that answer is similarly
unsettled. This Comment addresses that gap in the literature. It considers whether
policies under which government officials question individuals about their religion
and religious practices violate the Establishment Clause. Because the Clause is more
commonly used to consider government endorsement of religion (such as policies
concerning school prayer and displays on government property), this is an underexplored area of the law. This Comment therefore addresses why this type of religious
questioning is an appropriate topic for Establishment Clause analysis, proposes a
new test for Establishment Clause compliance, and provides examples of how the
test would apply to various factual scenarios.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you go to Toronto for a weekend trip with your family.
While driving home to Detroit, a border agent pulls you aside,
brings you into an isolated room, and asks you, seemingly out of
nowhere, “How many times a day do you pray?”
Now imagine you are an Arab Muslim man named Ali Suleiman
1
Ali. When you are asked this question, do you feel the same way
you do when the government requests that you report your religious affiliation on a census form? Or do you feel insulted, believing that this agent, operating in the shadow of September 11 and
statements by President Donald Trump like “Islam hates us” and
“we’re having problems with the Muslims,”2 has equated the religious practices he assumes you hold with some sort of threat?
The implications of this type of religious questioning by
government officials have been considered in two recent districtcourt cases: Cherri v Mueller3 (brought by Ali and other Muslim
Americans stopped at the Canadian border)4 and Isakhanova v
Muniz5 (brought by a Muslim American who was questioned by
prison guards while visiting her inmate son).6 After facing a line of
questions in this vein, the plaintiffs in each case argued that questions from government officials about plaintiffs’ religious practices
violated the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution.7 Prior
legal cases provided little guidance about whether the plaintiffs
had a cognizable Establishment Clause claim. Although the
Establishment Clause prohibits both government endorsement
1
See Cherri v Mueller, 951 F Supp 2d 918, 924–26 (ED Mich 2013) (detailing similar
questioning faced by Ali and his coplaintiffs).
2
See International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 857 F3d 554, 594–95 (4th
Cir 2017), vacd and remd, 2017 WL 4518553 (US) (listing times when Trump “expressed
anti-Muslim sentiment”); Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees
(CNN, Jan 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BM7H-MNLP.
3
951 F Supp 2d 918 (ED Mich 2013) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to dismiss).
4
Id at 923–27.
5
2016 WL 1640649 (ND Cal) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
6
Id at *5–6.
7
US Const Amend I, cl 1. See also Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 935; Isakhanova, 2016
WL 1640649 at *5–6.

2018]

A Borderline Case

195

and disapproval of religion,8 Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has historically focused on cases of endorsement. It has matured
through cases centered on nativity scenes, statues of the Ten
Commandments, and school prayer. And even this canonical
Establishment Clause case law is infamously muddled. Neither
the Cherri nor the Isakhanova court grappled with the complicated
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. They did not reason
through which test they ought to apply to religious-questioning
policies or take the chance to provide guidance to other courts on
how to analyze such a policy. Instead, they both provided cursory
holdings on their respective plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause
claims.
Courts should not treat religious-questioning policies so mechanically. These policies raise novel questions about the proper
scope and application of the Establishment Clause that have
recently gained urgency. Reports that border agents questioned
travelers about their religious practices during the implementation of Trump’s “travel ban” in January 2017 trigger the same
concerns as the practices considered in Cherri and Isakhanova.9
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Dick Durbin both raised similar
red flags when they questioned then–judicial nominee Amy Coney
Barrett about her Catholic beliefs during her September 2017
confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.10
This Comment therefore uses the Cherri and Isakhanova decisions
to start a broader discussion about the validity of religious questioning by government officials. Part I describes the tests used by
the Supreme Court when analyzing Establishment Clause cases.
It then explores a recent line of cases that provides guidance on
how courts should analyze government policies that disapprove
of, rather than endorse, religious beliefs. Part II introduces the

8

See Everson v Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US 1, 15–16 (1947).
See Amanda Holpuch and Ashifa Kassam, Canadian Muslim Grilled about Her
Faith and View on Trump at US Border Stop (The Guardian, Feb 10, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/TFR3-35YU (reporting that questions included “Which mosque do you go
to? What is the name of the imam? How often do you go to the mosque? What kind of
discussions do you hear in the mosque? Does the imam talk to you directly?”). See also
International Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F3d at 572 (affirming a preliminary injunction against the executive order “that in text speaks with vague words of national security,
but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination”).
10 Durbin asked Barrett, “Do you consider yourself an ‘orthodox Catholic’?” while
Feinstein noted, “[T]he dogma lives loudly within you. And that’s of concern.” Alexandra
Desanctis, Did Durbin and Feinstein Impose a Religious Test for Office? (National Review,
Sept 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LQL3-W7RY.
9
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legal question: whether religious questioning by government officials violates the Establishment Clause. Part III determines that
this legal question is properly analyzed under a novel “LemonLarson” test. This approach combines two of the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause tests to create a modified analysis that is
tailored to consider the countervailing government interests in
religious-questioning cases.11 Part III applies the Lemon-Larson
framework to religious-questioning scenarios. It concludes that
the questioning policies in both Cherri and Isakhanova would be
unconstitutional under the Lemon-Larson test, as would most
religious questioning. However, the Lemon-Larson test accommodates the government interests that truly require entanglement
with religion in a way that current Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not, adapting the Establishment Clause to a new
manifestation of disapproval-of-religion cases.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, AS INTERPRETED BY
THE COURTS
In contrast to the large volume of academic literature that
considers when the Establishment Clause has been violated, the
clause itself is to the point. The Establishment Clause reads,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”12 Part I.A examines how the Supreme Court has interpreted those ten words, focusing on the two tests most relevant to
the religious-questioning cases: the Lemon test and the Larson
test. Part I.B then presents a recent line of cases that demonstrate
that courts analyze disapproval-of-religion cases under the same
Establishment Clause tests as in the more common endorsement
cases. Part I.C concludes by examining how other constitutional
and statutory claims that could apply to religious-questioning
cases interact with the Establishment Clause.

11 See Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612–13 (1971); Larson v Valente, 456 US 228,
246 (1982).
12 US Const Amend I, cl 1. Despite the word “Congress,” the Supreme Court has
interpreted the First Amendment as applying to all federal government officials, as well
as all state officials, through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421,
429–30 (1962).
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The Background of the Establishment Clause and Its Tests

The foundational statement of what the Establishment
Clause prohibits comes from Everson v Board of Education of
Ewing Township,13 a 1947 Supreme Court decision:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion . . . or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.14
This passage added meat to the bare bones of the Establishment
Clause’s text. It also left open many unanswered questions.
Everson did not, for example, say anything about whether other
kinds of state actions could violate the Establishment Clause. Nor
did it specify the test that courts should use to identify when the
Establishment Clause had been violated.
The threshold question of what additional acts violate the
Establishment Clause, as well as the contours of the Everson
prohibitions, have been the subject of voluminous case law in the
decades since Everson. This case law can readily answer some
questions about Establishment Clause cases. For example, a government policy is judged primarily on its objective effect rather
than the subjective intent behind it.15 The Supreme Court has
also explicitly stated that a government policy can violate the
Establishment Clause even if the policy does not directly compel
the exercise of religion.16 There is little remaining debate on this
type of elementary Establishment Clause question.
Substantial debate remains, however, on the best way to
determine whether a specific government policy violates the
Establishment Clause. This Section provides an overview of the
various tests adopted by the Court in analyzing potential
Establishment Clause violations. It does so with the caveat that
the Supreme Court treats none of these tests as talismanic. The
Court has been inconsistent about the tests used to analyze
Establishment Clause cases. It has characterized the tests it does

13
14
15
16

330 US 1 (1947).
Id at 15–16.
See, for example, Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor concurring).
See Engel, 370 US at 430.
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employ merely as “helpful signposts.”17 Cases apply multiple
tests, with little discussion on whether any one is dispositive.18
Some justices have strongly criticized this “unintelligib[le]” approach to the interpretation of such an important constitutional
protection.19 Nevertheless, the Court’s Lemon and Larson tests
both illuminate how courts should treat religious-questioning
policies and are therefore detailed in this Section.
1. The Lemon test.
The Lemon test is generally considered the guiding, if flickering, light in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.20 The Court
has applied the Lemon test in a broad array of traditional
Establishment Clause cases, including those considering whether
school activity or overt government symbolism violates the
Establishment Clause.21 Taking its name from Lemon v Kurtzman,22
the Lemon test was initially described as a three-factor test.23
Although the Court eventually collapsed the third prong of the
analysis into the second,24 the original test included (1) whether

17 Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677, 686 (2005), quoting Hunt v McNair, 413 US 734,
741 (1973).
18 See, for example, Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290, 314–17
(2000) (applying the Lemon test but also considering the endorsement test and historical
practice).
19 Van Orden, 545 US at 697 (Thomas concurring) (“The unintelligibility of this
Court’s precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”).
20 See, for example, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc v DeWeese,
633 F3d 424, 431 (6th Cir 2011). Use of the Lemon test continues despite considerable
criticism. See, for example, Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 319
(Rehnquist dissenting) (listing cases that fault Lemon and bemoaning “the sisyphean task
of trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier described in Lemon”)
(quotation marks omitted). See also Emily Fitch, Comment, An Inconsistent Truth: The Various Establishment Clause Tests as Applied in the Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly)
“Religious” Symbols and Their Applicability Today, 34 NIU L Rev 431, 445 (2014).
21 See Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756,
773–80 (1973) (holding that tax benefits to parents whose children enrolled in nonpublic
schools were unconstitutional); Roemer v Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 US 736,
748–54 (1976) (holding that grants to private religious colleges were constitutional); Santa
Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 314–16 (holding that school policy permitting
student-led prayers before school football games was unconstitutional); McCreary County,
Kentucky v American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 US 844, 859–65 (2005)
(holding that displays of the Ten Commandments in courthouses were not necessarily
unconstitutional).
22 403 US 602 (1971).
23 See id at 612–13.
24 See text accompanying notes 52–55.
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the government policy has a legitimate secular purpose;25
(2) whether the policy’s primary effect is one of advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (3) whether the policy creates excessive
government entanglement with religion.26 A government policy
violates the Establishment Clause if it “fails to satisfy any of
these prongs.”27
The first prong, or the “purpose test,” concerns the “actual
purpose” of the policy.28 It seeks to expose pretextual purposes
that obfuscate a policy’s actual religious purpose.29 The object of
this prong is to “prevent[ ] [the] government from abandoning
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular
point of view in religious matters.” 30 In general, “no consideration
of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not
have a clearly secular purpose.”31 The Court often finds policies to
have invalid, religious purposes, even when the government has
provided what purports to be a secular purpose. For example, the
Court concluded that a policy requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in a school was religious, even though the
Government argued that it was intended to promote “the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization.”32 In another case, the
Court rejected as insincere a school’s claim that it required the
teaching of creationism alongside evolution to “protect academic
freedom.”33 It found, in contrast, that a voucher program meant
to provide assistance to poor children in a failing school district
furthered a valid secular purpose even though students could use
the vouchers at religious schools.34
The second prong, the “effects test,” or “endorsement test,” is
often the crux of the analysis. It considers, from an objective viewpoint, “whether the government action has the purpose or effect”
of either endorsing or disapproving of religion.35 The Court has
25 Though originally articulated as a secular legislative purpose, the Court has since
applied the purpose prong broadly to “legislation or governmental action.” Lynch, 465 US
at 680.
26 Lemon, 403 US at 612–13.
27 Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 583 (1987).
28 Lynch, 465 US at 690 (O’Connor concurring).
29 See Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 56 (1985).
30 McCreary County, 545 US at 860, quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v Amos, 483 US 327, 335 (1987).
31 Wallace, 472 US at 56.
32 Stone v Graham, 449 US 39, 41 (1980).
33 Edwards, 482 US at 586–87.
34 See Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639, 649, 653 (2002).
35 DeWeese, 633 F3d at 434 (quotation marks omitted).
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always understood endorsement and disapproval of religion as
opposite sides of the same coin. It prohibits both because they
reach beyond the governmental powers as “circumscribed by the
Constitution.”36 “[C]rucial” to this analysis is that “a government
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”37 A governmental policy does not need to succeed in promoting or degrading
a religion to violate the Establishment Clause. What matters is
whether a reasonable observer would understand the policy to be
motivated by a desire to endorse or disapprove of religion.38
Courts take a fact-intensive and context-sensitive approach to
this analysis.
To invalidate a policy under the effects test, courts must find
that endorsement or disapproval of religion is the primary effect
of a policy. For example, the Supreme Court concluded that a city’s
public display of a nativity scene did not violate the Establishment
Clause because the promotion of religion was not its primary effect. Instead, the Court found that the primary effect of the crèche
was to promote a “significant historical religious event . . . long
recognized as a National Holiday.”39 The Court also noted that:
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the crèche
is to advance religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause would require that we view it as more beneficial to
and more an endorsement of religion, for example, than
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending churchsponsored schools.40
This holding shows the Court’s willingness to look beyond the
overtly religious nature of a nativity scene in its Establishment
Clause analysis. It simultaneously hints at the Court’s desire to
avoid holdings that will invalidate a significant number of other
government policies. This is not to say that the Court is never
willing to find endorsement. Examples of government actions that

36

School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 US 203, 222 (1963).
Lynch, 465 US at 692 (O’Connor concurring) (emphasis added).
38 See Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 316 (“Therefore, the simple
enactment of this policy, with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student
prayer, was a constitutional violation. . . . Government efforts to endorse religion cannot
evade constitutional reproach based solely on the remote possibility that those attempts
may fail.”).
39 Lynch, 465 US at 680.
40 Id at 681.
37
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courts have struck down because of their unconstitutional effects
include pregame prayers at football games41 and an “editorialized”
version of the Ten Commandments in an Ohio state court that
“exhort[ed] a return to ‘moral absolutes.’” 42
Both the purpose and the effects prongs of the Lemon test are
objective, meaning they are based on how a reasonable observer
would understand the policies rather than on the government’s
subjective intent.43 The concern is that a government policy of
religious endorsement or disapproval will impermissibly “send[ ]
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community.”44 This is why the core of the
analysis is not what the government intends the policy to do but
what reasonable observers would understand the policy to do.45
Circuit courts have understood this guidance as militating
against policies that treat certain religious participants as “secondclass citizens,”46 “leav[e] members of minority faiths unwilling
participants” in public activities,47 or require average citizens to
“burrow into a difficult-to-access legislative record for evidence to
assure themselves that the government is not endorsing a religious view.”48
The Court has provided little guidance on exactly what this
“reasonable observer” knows, with justices acknowledging (almost
apologetically) that there is considerable judicial discretion to
determine exactly what a reasonable observer would know in any
situation.49 When deciding how the reasonable observer would
react to a government policy, lower courts assume that the reasonable observer has knowledge of the history and context of the
community in question. This is not “the everyday casual
41 Santa Fe Independent School District, 530 US at 312 (finding that the effect of
pregame prayers was to impermissibly pressure students to participate in worship).
42 DeWeese, 633 F3d at 434–35 (finding that this display of the Ten Commandments
had the effect of endorsing religion).
43 See McCreary County, 545 US at 862 (noting that “the eyes that look to purpose
belong to an ‘objective observer’” and do not call for “psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of
hearts”).
44 Lynch, 465 US at 688 (O’Connor concurring).
45 See id at 690 (O’Connor concurring); Santa Fe Independent School District, 530
US at 308.
46 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v City and County of San Francisco,
624 F3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir 2010).
47 Lund v Rowan County, North Carolina, 863 F3d 268, 290 (4th Cir 2017) (en banc).
48 Felix v City of Bloomfield, 841 F3d 848, 863–64 (10th Cir 2016).
49 See, for example, Utah Highway Patrol Association v American Atheists, Inc, 565
US 994, 1004 (2011) (Thomas dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“One might be forgiven
for failing to discern a workable principle that explains these wildly divergent outcomes.”).
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gawker.”50 Circuit-court cases suggest that courts generally
assume the reasonable observer adapts to the times and has fairly
extensive familiarity with the precise community in question
(down to the local county history).51
The third prong of the Lemon test, assessing government
entanglement with religion, has largely been subsumed into the
analysis of the second prong. In the 1997 case Agostini v Felton,52
the Supreme Court explicitly folded the third prong into the
second.53 It has since argued that “[t]his made sense because both
inquiries rely on the same evidence and the degree of entanglement has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits
religion.”54 Therefore, courts now consider ongoing and excessive
government entanglement with religion as evidence that a policy
fails the effects test.55
As with Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally,
courts do not have bright-line rules to determine when entanglement violates the Establishment Clause. Courts acknowledge
that the line between religion and the government resembles a
“blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier,” rather than a wall.56
“Fire inspections [and] building and zoning regulations . . . are
examples of necessary and permissible contacts” between religion
and the government.57 “Entanglement” becomes unconstitutional
when these “contacts” morph into unnecessary “intrusion.”58
Impermissible entanglement occurred in Lemon. The Court
considered statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that used
state money to fund religious elementary and middle schools,
provided those funds supported secular education within those

50 Cressman v Thompson, 798 F3d 938, 958 (10th Cir 2015). See also American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky v Mercer County, 432 F3d 624, 636 (6th Cir 2005).
51 See, for example, Freethought Society, of Greater Philadelphia v Chester County,
334 F3d 247, 260 (3d Cir 2003) (“[W]e will assume that the reasonable observer is informed
about the approximate age of the plaque and the fact that the County has done nothing
with the plaque since it was erected; we also conclude that the reasonable observer is
aware of the general history of Chester County.”).
52 521 US 203 (1997).
53 Id at 232–35.
54 Zelman, 536 US at 668–69 (citation omitted). See also Agostini, 521 US at 218,
232–33.
55 See Agostini, 521 US at 218, 232–33. As discussed in Part II.B, the two districtcourt decisions that inspired this Comment both incorrectly analyzed this prong under
Agostini, treating it as an independent part of the analysis.
56 Lemon, 403 US at 614.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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schools akin to that offered in public schools.59 The Court held that
“comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance”
would have been required to ensure that secular teachers in
parochial schools abided by the requirements for teachers in
public schools.60 The Lemon decision shows that the entanglement
inquiry, now used only as supporting evidence in the effects test,
requires courts to interrogate the “character,” “nature,” and “resulting relationship” of any government interaction with religion
in order to gauge whether the interaction crosses the line into
unconstitutional intrusion.61
2. The Larson test.
Although the Lemon test remains the primary test that courts
use to determine when state actions violate the Establishment
Clause, the Court has developed another Establishment Clause
test for cases involving government actions that discriminate
among religions rather than endorse or disparage religion as a
whole. This test was first articulated in Larson v Valente.62
In Larson, the Supreme Court considered governmentimposed reporting and registration requirements that applied to
only a subset of religions (those that solicited more than fifty
percent of their funds from nonmembers).63 Larson held that
strict scrutiny should be applied in cases in which a government
policy suggests a “denominational preference” between religions.64
When reviewing such a policy, the Lemon principles can offer
helpful guidance. However, Lemon is not the proper test to use to
analyze the policy.65
To survive strict scrutiny under the Larson test, as in other
contexts, the government must show that its policy furthers a
“compelling governmental interest” and is “closely fitted to further that interest.”66 The government has a compelling interest
only if it can prove that its policy addresses an “actual concrete
problem”: “For an interest to be sufficiently compelling to justify
59

Id at 606–07.
Lemon, 403 US at 619.
61 Id at 615.
62 456 US 228 (1982).
63 Id at 230.
64 Id at 245.
65 See id at 251–52 (“The [Lemon test is] intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions, like [the law considered in Larson], that
discriminate among religions.”) (citation omitted).
66 Larson, 456 US at 246–47.
60
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a law that discriminates among religions, the interest must
address an identified problem that the discrimination seeks to
remedy.”67 After this interest is identified, the government must
demonstrate that it has “closely fitted” its policy “to further that
interest.”68 For example, in Awad v Ziriax,69 a recent Tenth Circuit
case invalidating a proposed Oklahoma state constitutional ban
on the invocation of Sharia law in court, the court reasoned that
“[e]ven if the state could identify and support a reason to single
out and restrict Sharia law in its courts, the amendment’s complete
ban of Sharia law is hardly an exercise of narrow tailoring.”70
Perhaps surprisingly, given the frequency with which strict
scrutiny is used in other constitutional contexts, courts rarely use
the Larson test.71 In fact, before the Awad court analyzed the ban
on Sharia law, it discussed whether the infrequent use of Larson
had in fact rendered it bad law. It concluded that rare application
of a doctrine did not invalidate a Supreme Court precedent that
had never been explicitly overturned.72 There are several possible
explanations for courts’ rare reliance on Larson. For one, the
unpredictable application of Larson may simply represent a
symptom of the general inconsistency in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Another potential reason is that Larson is in fact
obsolete. If so, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly concluded that Larson
applied in Awad. The Supreme Court’s own actions, however, suggest that Larson remains a viable, if secondary, Establishment
Clause test.73 While citations to Larson are rare, they exist: the
Supreme Court has cited Larson in just under two dozen cases
since its publication.74 Another explanation is that courts so
rarely employ Larson because they are more likely to scrutinize
government preferences among religions when the government is
disapproving of a religion. They may be less wary of policies that

67 Awad v Ziriax, 670 F3d 1111, 1129 (10th Cir 2012), citing Brown v Entertainment
Merchants Association, 564 US 786, 799 (2011).
68 Larson, 456 US at 247.
69 670 F3d 1111 (10th Cir 2012).
70 Id at 1131.
71 See Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson
in Retrospect, 8 NY City L Rev 53, 76–87 (2005) (discussing the infrequent use of Larson
by the Supreme Court).
72 See Awad, 670 F3d at 1127–28.
73 See Patrick-Justice, 8 NY City L Rev at 76–87, 120 (cited in note 71) (discussing
how Larson is on the “peripher[y]” of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but
remains an active doctrine).
74 See id at 76.
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endorse individual religions or less likely to view those as discriminating among religions. If that were the case, courts might be
more likely to apply Larson in disapproval-of-religion cases. Both
Larson and Awad can be distinguished from cases like Lynch
based on the fact that they involved government practices that
were critical—rather than approving—of a religion. Disapprovalof-religion cases are rarer than endorsement cases,75 which could
explain why courts rarely apply Larson. However, as discussed in
Part I.B, even when confronted with government actions disapproving of beliefs or practices associated with particular religious
traditions, courts frequently apply the Lemon test rather than the
Larson test.76
The most promising explanation for why courts rarely rely on
Larson is probably that the Supreme Court’s narrow understanding of what it means for a policy to facially discriminate among
religions limits the situations in which Larson may apply. In fact,
many cases analyzed under the Lemon doctrine concern a practice
that implicates a denominational preference. Consider the crèche
case discussed earlier, Lynch v Donnelly.77 It is hard to argue that
this case involved government endorsement of religion generally.
If the government’s actions constituted an endorsement of anything,
it was of Christianity. Nevertheless, the Court did not apply Larson
on the grounds that the Larson test applies only when a policy is
“patently discriminat[ing]” among religions.78 This holding
suggests that a policy concerning “generalized Christianity” or
theism does not count as facial discrimination.79 Thus, a policy
that preferences Christianity as opposed to other religions is generally insufficient to trigger Larson strict scrutiny. A showing of
a more specific denominational target is required. The Tenth
Circuit in Awad based its unusual decision to apply the Larson
strict scrutiny test on the fact that the law in question invalidated
only Sharia law, as opposed to all religious laws. The court took this
to mean that the law was truly discriminating among religions.80

75

See note 92.
See, for example, C.F. v Capistrano Unified School District, 615 F Supp 2d 1137,
1145 (CD Cal 2009), vacd on other grounds, 654 F3d 975 (9th Cir 2011).
77 465 US 668, 681 (1984). For more discussion of the complexity of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, see Part I.A.3 (introducing cases that rely on neither the Larson nor
the Lemon test).
78 Lynch, 465 US at 687 n 13.
79 See id. See also Patrick-Justice, 8 NY City L Rev at 81 (cited in note 71).
80 See Awad, 670 F3d at 1128.
76
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3. Other tests.
Lemon and Larson are hardly the only tests courts use in
Establishment Clause cases. However, other tests—including the
endorsement test, neutrality principle, and coercion test—are less
useful as analytic tools in the religious-questioning cases considered in this Comment.81 The endorsement test is itself just an
elaboration of the Lemon test’s second prong, first articulated by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her influential concurrence in
Lynch.82 The neutrality principle—asking whether a government
practice is neutral toward religion—is embedded within the
Establishment Clause and the other Establishment Clause tests,
including the Lemon test. It is not its own independent test.83
Finally, the coercion test, which questions whether a government
practice is coercive to individuals, is not the law84—a majority of
the Supreme Court has not embraced the coercion test. Instead,
concurring or dissenting opinions occasionally recommend its
adoption.85 Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has used the
coercion test in his arguments that the scope of the Establishment
Clause should be narrowed.86
A recent Supreme Court trend, evident in Van Orden v
Perry,87 is to ground Establishment Clause analyses in historical
practice.88 In Van Orden, the Court explicitly stated that the
Lemon test was not helpful when dealing with “passive monument[s],” such as a statue of the Ten Commandments on the
grounds of the Texas state capitol.89 Similar to the neutrality
principle, historical practice is not a stand-alone test. The Court
instead simply decided to give significant deference to past

81 For a detailed discussion of these tests, see Fitch, Comment, 34 NIU L Rev at 435–
44 (cited in note 20).
82 See Lynch, 465 US at 687–90 (O’Connor concurring). O’Connor’s concurrence from
Lynch is widely cited, including by the Supreme Court, and treated as very influential, if
not binding, law. See Fitch, Comment, 34 NIU L Rev at 436–37 (cited in note 20).
83 See Good News Club v Milford Central School, 533 US 98, 114 (2001); Rosenberger
v Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US 819, 839 (1995) (“A central lesson
of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face
of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion.”).
84 See Van Orden, 545 US at 694 (Thomas concurring).
85 See, for example, County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 US 573, 659–60 (1989) (Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 See, for example, Van Orden, 545 US at 694–98 (Thomas concurring).
87 545 US 677 (2005).
88 See id at 686.
89 Id.
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practice: “[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of
the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific
practice is permitted . . . and has withstood the critical scrutiny
of time and political change.”90 The Supreme Court, when it relies
on evidence of longstanding practice, uses history as a proxy for
the constitutionality of a government policy. The historicalpractice trend has identified a kind of evidence particularly
relevant in Establishment Clause cases but has not replaced the
principles encoded in the Lemon test.91
B.

Disapproving of, Rather Than Endorsing, Religion

Excepting Larson and Awad, the Establishment Clause violations discussed so far have involved government endorsement
of religion. This is because the vast majority of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence involves endorsement. There are only a few
cases that apply the Establishment Clause to disapproval of a
religion.92 However, government policies that disapprove of or
express hostility toward a religion undeniably violate the
Establishment Clause.93 In Everson, the Supreme Court clearly
stated that the Establishment Clause not only proscribes endorsement but also “punish[ment]” of religious beliefs.94 This

90
91

Town of Greece v Galloway, 134 S Ct 1811, 1819 (2014).
See id at 1818–19 (citations omitted):

[Marsh v Chambers] is sometimes described as “carving out an exception” to the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, because it sustained legislative
prayer without subjecting the practice to “any of the formal ‘tests’ that have
traditionally structured” this inquiry. The Court in Marsh found those tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that legislative invocations
are compatible with the Establishment Clause. . . . Yet Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation
if not for its historical foundation.
See also Marsh v Chambers, 463 US 783, 800–02 (1983) (Brennan dissenting).
92 See American Family Association, Inc v City and County of San Francisco, 277
F3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir 2002) (“[B]ecause it is far more typical for an Establishment
Clause case to challenge instances in which the government has done something that
favors religion or a particular religious group, we have little guidance concerning what
constitutes a primary effect of inhibiting religion.”). See also Jay Wexler, Government
Disapproval of Religion, 2013 BYU L Rev 119, 120–24 (discussing the “exceedingly rare”
use of the disapproval side of the Establishment Clause).
93 See Vasquez v Los Angeles County, 487 F3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir 2007) (“Although
Lemon is most frequently invoked in cases involving alleged governmental preferences to
religion, the test also ‘accommodates the analysis of a claim brought under a hostility to
religion theory.’”), citing American Family Association, 277 F3d at 1121.
94 Everson, 330 US at 15–16.
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Comment focuses on the disapproval side of the Establishment
Clause coin.
While the Supreme Court has offered little guidance in this
area, recent circuit-court decisions provide a framework for
understanding what type of government policy violates the
Establishment Clause by disapproving of religion. They also
demonstrate that courts approach such fact patterns in the same
fact-specific, and occasionally doctrinally inconsistent, way as
endorsement cases. Several benchmark cases applying the Lemon
framework come from the Ninth Circuit. In Vasquez v Los Angeles
County,95 the court held that a county government removing a
cross from a county seal was appropriate, as it was not “motivated
by hostility toward Christianity”—it was, in fact, motivated by
the legitimate secular purpose of avoiding an Establishment
Clause lawsuit.96 Similarly, in Vernon v City of Los Angeles,97 a
government investigation into an assistant police chief’s religious
practices did not violate the Establishment Clause.98 The court
applied a Lemon analysis without mentioning Larson, even
though the investigation focused on Robert Vernon’s involvement
with a specific sect, the Grace Community Church.99 The court
held that the investigation was appropriately motivated by
Vernon’s erratic job performance.100 He had been quoted as depicting the police as “ministers of God,” ordering that no one was to
be arrested at pro-life demonstrations, and pressuring police
officers to attend church services.101 The investigation focused
narrowly on whether his religious beliefs were impermissibly
affecting his job duties, the questioning did not represent an ongoing policy, and the officers investigating him explicitly told him
they were not telling him what his religious beliefs should be.102
The Tenth Circuit’s Awad decision, discussed in Part I.A.2,
also explored disapproval of religion. The court decided that the
Larson test was the best approach when scrutinizing a proposed

95

487 F3d 1246 (9th Cir 2007).
Id at 1255.
97 27 F3d 1385 (9th Cir 1994).
98 See id at 1396–1401.
99 Id at 1388, 1396–1401.
100 Id at 1388–89.
101 See Vernon, 27 F3d at 1388–89.
102 See id at 1388–89, 1398–99. See also American Family Association, 277 F3d at
1121–23 (holding that a city prohibition on anti-gay advertisements paid for by religious
groups had a secular purpose and a primary effect of “encouraging equal rights for gays
and discouraging hate crimes,” not of “inhibiting” religion).
96

2018]

A Borderline Case

209

state constitutional amendment that would outlaw Sharia law in
Oklahoma courts.103 Unlike the Ninth Circuit cases, therefore, the
Tenth Circuit eschewed the Lemon test in this disapproval-ofreligion case. Under this alternative lens, the court found that the
policy did not address a “concrete problem” or support a compelling interest and likely violated the Establishment Clause: “[T]o
sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is
not warranted.”104
A line of cases that sheds light on the specific concerns raised
by religious-questioning policies involves policies of disparaging
remarks toward a religion. In the 1983 case Marsh v Chambers,105
the Court noted that such policies can violate the Establishment
Clause.106 A district court in California offered examples of statements that fall on both sides of the “disparaging” line in C.F. v
Capistrano Unified School District.107 It found that a teacher’s
comment that creationism was “religious, superstitious
nonsense” violated the Establishment Clause by disapproving of
a religion.108 Other comments the teacher made for educational
purposes and not to demonstrate his own beliefs (such as, “What
was it that Mark Twain said? ‘Religion was invented when the
first con man met the first fool.’”) did not rise to the level of a
violation.109 The court did not buy the argument that the “superstitious” statement was made for the secular purpose of education, concluding instead it was “unequivocal[ly]” driven by the
belief that such religious beliefs actually were nonsense.110 The
teacher could have easily taught the lesson without “disparaging
those views.”111

103

Awad, 670 F3d at 1116, 1126–29.
Id at 1130 (quotation marks omitted).
105 463 US 783 (1983).
106 Id at 794–95 (“The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here,
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or
advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”) (emphasis added).
107 615 F Supp 2d 1137, 1146–49 (CD Cal 2009), vacd on other grounds, 654 F3d at
978, 988 (granting the teacher qualified immunity, but acknowledging that “[a]t some
point a teacher’s comments on religion might cross the line and rise to the level of unconstitutional hostility”). For more discussion, see generally Jennifer L. Bryant, Note, Talking
“Religious, Superstitious Nonsense” in the Classroom: When Do Teachers’ Disparaging Comments about Religion Run Afoul of the Establishment Clause?, 86 S Cal L Rev 1343 (2013).
108 Capistrano, 615 F Supp 2d at 1146.
109 Id.
110 Id at 1149.
111 Id.
104

210

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:193

Town of Greece v Galloway,112 which concerned a prayer program at monthly town board meetings, offered an additional standard for which statements rise to the level of an Establishment
Clause violation. Town of Greece held that disparaging but oneoff comments that are part of a larger, nondisparaging whole
likely do not rise to the level of a prohibited government act.113
This included the comment by a visiting minister at one of the
town meetings that an “ignorant” religious minority did not
respect the history of the country.114 The Capistrano decisions (at
the district and appellate levels) both acknowledged this requirement, suggesting that the “religious, superstitious nonsense”
statement impermissibly signaled government disapproval of a
religion, but that the plaintiff also had to demonstrate “ongoing
entanglement.”115 Though courts have offered little guidance on
the precise character of remarks required to meet this threshold
of religious disapproval, a policy of disparaging remarks can
clearly rise to the level of an Establishment Clause violation.
This Comment builds on this line of cases to explore a new
type of disapproval-of-religion policy—religious questioning—in
order to see how the Establishment Clause can adapt to and inform a new type of government entanglement with religion.
C.

How the Establishment Clause Interacts with Other
Potential Claims

It is important to note that this Comment’s focus on the
Establishment Clause is not intended to suggest that religious
questioning does not implicate other constitutional protections.
Relevant provisions likely include the Free Exercise Clause116 and
the Equal Protection Clause.117 Plaintiffs could also bring statutory claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993118 (RFRA), among other acts.

112

134 S Ct 1811 (2014).
See id at 1824.
114 Id (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an
impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer
will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”).
115 Capistrano, 615 F Supp 2d at 1153. See also Capistrano, 654 F3d at 986.
116 US Const Amend I, cl 1 (preventing the government from “prohibiting the free
exercise” of religion).
117 US Const Amend XIV, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
118 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
113
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The Establishment Clause is not merely redundant, though;
it provides unique guidance for what types of government entanglement with religion are permissible. The jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause reflects the Court’s attempts
to balance the “unbroken history of official acknowledgment” of the
role of religion in “American life” with the mandated separation
of church and state.119 It provides a framework to navigate the
complicated role of religion in American society.120 It also analyzes
these questions from a different angle than its sister clause in the
Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause.121 Finally, it does so more
thoroughly than the Free Exercise Clause—there is significantly
more case law and Court guidance on the Establishment
Clause.122
Besides offering helpful guidance for religious-questioning
cases, the Establishment Clause offers litigants different paths to
success in court. Policies analyzed under the Equal Protection
Clause,123 the Free Exercise Clause,124 and RFRA125 generally all
face strict scrutiny. Some policies that fail this test would nonetheless survive under the various Establishment Clause tests
described in Part I, and vice versa. There are also instances when
a plaintiff may have standing to bring an Establishment Clause
claim but not a Free Exercise or RFRA claim. To bring a Free
Exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege a “substantial burden” on
his religious practices.126 Courts have held that increased financial
119 See Van Orden, 545 US at 683–86 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Lynch, 465
US at 674.
120 See, for example, Van Orden, 545 US at 683–84 (discussing how every Establishment
Clause case must recognize that “[o]ur institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” and that
the Court must flexibly respond to this history by “neither abdicat[ing] our responsibility
to maintain a division between church and state nor evinc[ing] a hostility to religion by
disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage”).
121 See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L Rev
299, 306 (“[T]he establishment clause focuses on the protection of government from the
encroachment of the church . . . while the free exercise clause reflects [ ] the . . . view of
protecting religion from the state.”).
122 Id at 306 n 34.
123 See, for example, City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 493–94 (1989).
124 Although the phrase “strict scrutiny” is not often used in the Free Exercise Clause
context (whose case law at times mirrors the confusion seen in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence), courts apply the “most exacting scrutiny” and look for “compelling”
government interests. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v Comer, 137 S Ct 2012,
2021, 2024 (2017).
125 See, for example, Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
US 418, 430 (2006).
126 See Patel v United States Bureau of Prisons, 515 F3d 807, 813 (8th Cir 2008) (describing how this burden must “significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression
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costs of practicing a religion127 and a lack of access to halal food in
prison128 do not constitute substantial burdens. RFRA has similar
practical limitations129 and applies only to federal officials.130
Given these precedents, temporary religious questioning like that
in Cherri and Isakhanova that does not alter a plaintiff’s religious
practices will likely not reach the level of a substantial burden.
The Establishment Clause analysis does not demand an individual demonstrate such a burden.131 As long as standard standing
requirements132 are met, a plaintiff can bring an Establishment
Clause claim even if the questioning does not alter his religious
practices before or after the religious questioning occurs.
***
Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not provide clearcut rules for testing the constitutionality of government policies
that invoke religion. Recent court practice suggests that the
Lemon test remains the prevailing Establishment Clause test, but
that other tests, such as the Larson test, are appropriate in certain factual scenarios. This unsettled legal landscape is even less
developed in disapproval-of-religion cases. As the cases discussed
in Part I.B demonstrate, courts have generally analyzed disparaging remarks toward religion under traditional Establishment
Clause frameworks. Importantly, they have demonstrated a willingness to find that such policies violate the Establishment
Clause.

that manifests some central tenet of a person’s individual religious beliefs,” “meaningfully
curtail a person’s ability to express adherence to his or her faith,” or “deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion”),
citing Murphy v Missouri Department of Corrections, 372 F3d 979, 988 (8th Cir 2004).
127 See Braunfeld v Brown, 366 US 599, 605 (1961).
128 See Patel, 515 F3d at 814.
129 The Court has found that RFRA applies when an individual “alleges a substantial
burden on his or her free exercise of religion.” City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 532 (1997).
130 Id at 536. Only twenty-nine states have adopted state-level RFRAs. See Ira C.
Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 Ala
CR & CL L Rev 1, 48–49 (2015). RFRA expands the protections granted by the Free Exercise
Clause by extending scrutiny to “neutral, generally applicable” laws that “incidentally”
burden religious exercise, which are not the type of policy considered in this Comment.
Holt v Hobbs, 135 S Ct 853, 859 (2015).
131 See Galloway v Town of Greece, 681 F3d 20, 30 n 4 (2d Cir 2012), revd on other
grounds, 134 S Ct 1811 (discussing the broad standing available for Establishment Clause
claims).
132 For a brief summary of modern standing requirements, see Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560–61 (1992).

2018]

A Borderline Case

213

II. RELIGIOUS QUESTIONING BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Though the Establishment Clause provides a helpful lens
through which to analyze disapproval-of-religion policies, one
subset of these policies that has still received almost no attention
from courts is religious questioning. This type of questioning
raises thornier Establishment Clause questions than the kind of
questioning at stake in cases like Vernon. The questioning of
Vernon was prompted by and tailored to his job performance.133
In contrast, the government questioning in the two district-court
cases analyzed in this Part, Cherri and Isakhanova, was
prompted by nothing other than the plaintiffs’ apparent religion.
This Part concludes that religious questioning of this kind raises
novel, underexplored Establishment Clause issues that deserve
more attention than courts have afforded them.
A.

Relevant District-Court Cases

Of the two cases, Cherri presents the more challenging fact
pattern. In Cherri, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents (collectively, “border
agents”) questioned the plaintiffs—Muslim American citizens—
about their religion when crossing the US-Canada border.134 The
questioning was prompted “solely” by the apparent religion of the
plaintiffs and a perceived connection between this religion and
“terrorist activities.”135 Questions included “Which mosque do you
go to?”; “How many times a day do you pray?”; “Who is your religious leader?”; and “Do you perform your morning prayer at the
mosque?”136 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants “implemented a policy . . . which include[d] asking
Muslim American travelers a substantially similar set of questions about their Islamic beliefs and practices.” 137 The plaintiffs
alleged similar practices at no fewer than seven other border
entry points, with questions including “When did you become a
Muslim?”; “Are there any extremists or terrorists at the
mosque?”; and “Do you know any terrorists?”138

133

See Vernon, 27 F3d at 1388–89.
See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 923–27.
135 Id at 927, 935.
136 Id at 924.
137 Id.
138 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 926. The defendants had previously explored the legality
of these policies internally, finding little guidance from the courts. See id at 924–25.
134
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The Cherri court found the plaintiffs did not have an
Establishment Clause claim and granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment and RFRA claims.139
The court reached this conclusion because the plaintiffs’ allegations did not state a claim under what it viewed as the three
prongs of the Lemon test.140 First, the plaintiffs did not, the court
concluded, allege the policy had a “religious objective.” Second,
the court held that a reasonable person would not conclude that
the religious questioning they experienced constituted an endorsement of religion. Finally, the plaintiffs did not state facts establishing excessive government entanglement.141 The court argued
that an Equal Protection Clause claim was “better suited” to the
facts.142
A few years later, the Isakhanova court also addressed
whether religious questioning by a government official violated
the Establishment Clause. In Isakhanova, the Muslim mother of
a state prison inmate faced religious questioning and disparaging
remarks about Islam after prison guards detained her on suspicion
of sneaking tobacco to her son.143 She was asked questions like
“What kind of Muslim are you—Sunni or Shia?”; “Do you pray five
times a day?”; and “What mosque do you go to?” She was told “All
Muslims are terrorists” and “America is no place for Muslims.”144
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.145 It
found that the “derogatory comments” made by the prison guards
to the plaintiff violated the Lemon test.146 Because the prison
guards were allegedly searching the plaintiff for tobacco, there
was no clear “secular purpose” for their religious questioning and
“statements such as ‘All Muslims are terrorists’ would be perceived by any reasonable Muslim as ‘disapproval of their individual religious choices.’” 147 Finally, “under the third prong of Lemon,
statements such as, ‘America is no place for Muslims,’ foster
excessive governmental entanglement with religion, because they

139

See id at 937–38. The court did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims. Id.
Id at 933–36.
141 Id at 936.
142 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 936–37. For a discussion of what an Establishment
Clause analysis adds, see Part I.C.
143 See Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *1, 5–6.
144 Id at *5–6.
145 See id at *1.
146 Id at *5–6.
147 Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6.
140
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run afoul of the prohibition against ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political
community.’” 148
B.

Limitations of the District-Court Decisions

Neither Cherri nor Isakhanova provided a satisfying analysis
of the Establishment Clause issues raised by religious questioning of the type the plaintiffs in those cases experienced. For one
thing, both opinions appear to oversimplify Supreme Court precedent: each applied the Lemon test without discussing whether it
was the proper Establishment Clause test for the situation and
without acknowledging developments in Lemon jurisprudence,
such as the effective elimination of the third prong.149
Furthermore, each case discussed the Lemon test only briefly
and the cases came to opposite conclusions through largely conclusory statements. The cases are in some ways distinguishable
on their facts. The prison guard in Isakhanova explicitly insulted
Islam. It is hard to think of any motivation for his comments other
than animus toward the religion. The questions asked by the border agents in Cherri cannot be as easily dismissed as extraneous.
Those factual differences should not obscure the fact that the two
courts also applied the law inconsistently. While the Isakhanova
court relied on Cherri in its decision to apply Lemon, it did not
address these inconsistencies.150
Take each court’s discussion of the first Lemon prong (the
purpose test). In Cherri, the court stated that the government’s
“claimed association between [the plaintiffs’] Islamic beliefs and
terrorist activities” did not demonstrate a religious objective.151
The Isakhanova court inferred a religious objective based on the
government’s failure to demonstrate a legitimate association
between the plaintiff’s Islamic beliefs and criminal activities
(sneaking in tobacco).152 At an abstract level, the same thing happened in each instance: a government official asked questions
about religious practices in the context of an investigation into
whether the plaintiff had committed a crime. The Cherri court
saw a secular purpose for this questioning; the Isakhanova court
148

Id, citing Lynch, 465 US at 687 (O’Connor concurring).
See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 933–36; Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *5. See
also text accompanying notes 53–55.
150 See Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *5.
151 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 935.
152 Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6.
149
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did not. The legal grounding for those different findings is
unclear. Because of the different contexts and considerations
involved in each case, the opposite findings may have actually
been completely justified. As a matter of common sense, questions
about Islam are more probative when considering potential
terrorist activities than when considering smuggled tobacco.153
The Isakhanova court did not, however, explicitly ground its holding in any type of showing that the interrogation in Cherri was
more likely to uncover crimes than that in Isakhanova. The
Cherri court did not discuss whether the government’s purpose
was pretextual, and thus invalid, as the Isakhanova court did.154
The Cherri court did not suggest that the questions asked were
likely to actually root out terrorist activity, implying that an
initial association between a religious belief and a crime allows
for indiscriminate questioning about that religious belief. It did
not distinguish between questions asked or consider whether
some expressed unconstitutional animus toward a religion, even
if others did not. It did not explore whether a reasonable observer
would understand specific questions like “Do you consider yourself a religious person?” and “Are you part of any Islamic tribes?”
to have a religious objective.155
These same inconsistencies apply to each court’s conclusions
about whether a reasonable person would find the questioning to
express disapproval of religion under the effects test.156 The effects
prong of the Lemon test looks at the message communicated by a
policy, not the factors motivating the policy.157 Despite this, the
Cherri court did not ask whether a reasonable observer would
think that questions like “Are there any extremists or terrorists
at [your] mosque?” would make the plaintiffs feel as though they
were not complete members of the “political community.”158 It did
not explore the salience of a government policy explicitly connecting the practice of a religion with terrorist activities. In fact, it
concluded that these questions merely stopped the plaintiffs from
“cross[ing] the border in a timely fashion” and did not “endors[e]”
a religion—without mentioning that the Establishment Clause

153 For a discussion on why courts cannot merely rely on this type of “common sense,”
see text accompanying notes 167–81.
154 See text accompanying notes 30–34.
155 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 926.
156 See id at 935–36; Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6.
157 See text accompanying notes 35–38.
158 Lynch, 465 US at 687.
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also prohibits disapproval of a religion.159 In its decision, the
Isakhanova court did not criticize Cherri. It also did not explain
why a reasonable observer would think a government official connecting Islam with tobacco smuggling disapproves of a religion,
even though connecting it with terrorism (certainly a worse crime)
does not. It did not explain why comments like “All Muslims are
terrorists” violate the Establishment Clause even though leading
questions from Cherri like “Do you know any terrorists?” do not.
Neither court acknowledged the likely fact that they were making
their assumptions based on common sense. Both courts may indeed
have been satisfied that all of these concerns were misplaced, but
this lack of discussion leaves unclear which differences supported
opposite conclusions in Cherri and Isakhanova, as well as
whether the courts were correct to rely on those differences.
Using these cases’ fact patterns as a starting point, this
Comment more carefully explores the Establishment Clause concerns triggered by a government policy of asking questions regarding religious practices, and the difficult question of what test
should be employed in such cases.
III. APPLYING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TO RELIGIOUSQUESTIONING POLICIES USING THE LEMON-LARSON TEST
This Part picks up where the Cherri and Isakhanova courts
left off, analyzing when religious-questioning policies violate the
Establishment Clause. It argues that neither the Lemon nor the
Larson test provides an adequate vehicle for analyzing whether
religious questioning violates the Establishment Clause. It suggests that courts should instead apply a hybrid version of the two
tests, the Lemon-Larson test, which is tailored to the specific concerns that religious-questioning cases raise. Part III.A introduces
the mechanics of the hybrid test. Part III.B examines the sources
available to courts when applying the test. Part III.C applies the
Lemon-Larson test to Cherri, Isakhanova, and various other
factual situations to demonstrate how it ought to be applied and
how it helps work through the concerns triggered by religiousquestioning policies. Part III.D concludes with a summary of why
the Lemon-Larson test is the proper test to apply to these novel
Establishment Clause cases.

159

Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 936.
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A Hybrid Approach: The Lemon-Larson Test

The proposed Lemon-Larson test has three steps. Step One
applies Larson strict scrutiny to the policy in question. Step Two
applies the Lemon effects test. Step Three applies a balancing test
if there are divergent Step One and Step Two outcomes. The
Lemon-Larson test therefore replaces the first prong of Lemon,
the purpose test, with the Larson strict scrutiny inquiry. It also
employs a balancing test at Step Three, rather than necessarily
invalidating any government policy that “fails to satisfy” any of
the Lemon prongs.160
A court evaluating a religious-questioning policy under
Lemon-Larson will start by applying strict scrutiny to the policy.
As in Larson, this requires that the court determine whether the
policy furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and is “closely
fitted to further that interest.”161 The court may find the policy
invalid under Step One. In this case, the court does not need to
continue the analysis because the policy is unconstitutional.
If the policy passes Step One, meaning it passes strict scrutiny, the court will proceed to Step Two. Substantively, the Step
Two analysis remains largely the same as the analysis already
undertaken by courts under the Lemon effects test, including the
incorporation of the “entanglement” inquiry.162 The court will consider the effects of a government policy and look for policies that
“communicat[e] a message” of disapproval toward a religion.163
Failing at Step Two renders a policy presumptively invalid.
Unlike in Lemon, however, a government policy does not
necessarily fail under Lemon-Larson if it fails the effects test.
Step Three is a balancing test that weighs the effects of a government policy against the government interests underlying the policy. Step Three is triggered in cases in which Step One suggests a
policy is valid and Step Two suggests that it is invalid. Although
the presumption in favor of invalidity will mean that a failure at
Step Two will often doom a policy, Step Three ensures that the
effects test does not always prove outcome determinative. Instead,
it allows for a persuasive analysis at Step One to influence the
outcome even when Step Two would find a policy invalid. This
requires a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis: “Every government

160
161
162
163

Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578, 583 (1987).
Larson, 456 US at 246–47.
See Part I.A.1.
Lynch, 465 US at 692 (O’Connor concurring).
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practice must be judged in its unique circumstances.”164 The practical application of this step is explored in Part III.C. At a general
level, a close finding at Step One will never outweigh a presumptive finding of invalidity at Step Two, even if the Step Two finding
is also close. Similarly, a Step One analysis that suggests a policy
indisputably passes strict scrutiny will not outweigh a Step Two
finding that the policy just as indisputably violates the effects
test. However, policies that are close calls at Step Two may nevertheless survive if they pass Step One by a wide margin.
To summarize, in order to pass the Lemon-Larson test, a
religious-questioning policy must have a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored and that policy must either
(1) not have the effect of disapproving of (or endorsing) religion or
(2) if it does have the effect of disapproving of a religion, overcome
a presumption in favor of finding the policy unconstitutional.
B.

Sources to Help Courts Apply the Lemon-Larson Test

Though existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence informs
how courts ought to undertake Step Two, analogous areas of law
in which courts have applied strict scrutiny to discrimination
against protected classes can guide courts when performing the
strict scrutiny test in Step One and the corresponding balancing
test in Step Three. Courts have provided guidance on what count
as compelling government interests. These include protecting
national security and preventing crimes.165 Instructive cases also
show that not every government activity that involves a protected
class necessarily raises alarm.166
Specific cases provide benchmarks that can guide courts’
Steps One and Three analyses. These cases show that even
generally compelling interests—such as protecting national security—will not justify a policy that appears to be driven by mere
common sense, particularly when that common sense reeks of
bias. Hassan v City of New York167 is a recent Third Circuit opinion that denied the city’s motion to dismiss claims concerning the
164

Id at 694 (O’Connor concurring).
See Hassan v City of New York, 804 F3d 277, 306–07 (3d Cir 2015); Schall v
Martin, 467 US 253, 264 (1984).
166 See, for example, Lewis v Ascension Parish School Board, 806 F3d 344, 357 (5th
Cir 2015) (noting that “the [Supreme] Court has unequivocally stated that a legislative
body’s mere awareness or consideration of racial demographics in drawing district boundaries will not alone trigger strict scrutiny” unless race is the “predominant” motivating
factor).
167 804 F3d 277 (3d Cir 2015).
165
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broad surveillance by the New York Police Department (NYPD) of
the New York City Muslim community following September 11.168
The city argued that national security and public safety concerns
justified the NYPD’s surveillance policy. The court, applying
heightened scrutiny to the Equal Protection claim, was not convinced. The “gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of
questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose.”169 The court held that the city
had to ground its “asserted justification” in “objective evidence,”
not merely “appeals to ‘common sense’ which might be inflected
by stereotypes”—and even then the policy had to “fit” better than
any “alternative means.”170
Another instructive case is the Second Circuit’s Tabbaa v
Chertoff.171 This case complements Hassan by offering an example
of a policy that passed strict scrutiny because it was properly
tailored and there were no clear alternative means available to
accomplish the government’s goals. The court found a stop-andsearch policy that affected certain Muslims at the border to be
constitutional under strict scrutiny.172 The narrow tailoring of the
policy was crucial to the court’s decision. The policy did not target
all Muslims, but only participants of a conference on Islam. The
CBP initiated its policy after receiving specific intelligence linking
the conference to extremism.173 Finally, the searches were routine
and did not include heightened or invasive searches.174
Another related and instructive line of strict scrutiny jurisprudence considers policies that discriminate based on race.
While religion and race are governed by different constitutional
clauses, they interact closely in the space of discrimination and
profiling, making this analogy appropriate.175 One of the few times
168

Id at 306.
Id.
170 Id (quotation marks omitted).
171 509 F3d 89 (2d Cir 2007).
172 See id at 107.
173 See id at 106.
174 See id at 99.
175 Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 Cornell L Rev 491, 491–92 (1994) (“There is a powerful resemblance between
the government singling out persons for imposition of adverse consequences because of
their skin color and because of [ ] their ideological beliefs. This likeness calls for analogous
handling under the Constitution.”) (citations omitted). See also generally Mary Anne Case,
Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses?, 2000 S
Ct Rev 325; Ming Hsu Chen, Note, Two Wrongs Make a Right: Hybrid Claims of Discrimination, 79 NYU L Rev 685 (2004). See also Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 901 (1990) (O’Connor concurring) (“[T]he First
169
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such a discriminatory policy is valid is when the government is
facing a “social emergency”176 and if the chosen policy fits the
“compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype.”177 An informative case is United States v MonteroCamargo,178 in which the Ninth Circuit found unconstitutional a
policy whereby border agents, based only on the drivers’ Hispanic
ethnicity, stopped drivers out of suspicion of their immigration
status.179 Echoing the concerns that animate the Lemon test, the
court stated that such a policy both had “little probative value”
and “send[s] a clear message that those who are not white enjoy
a lesser degree of constitutional protection—that they are in
effect assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals
second.”180
As demonstrated in the following Section, the logic used in
these and similar cases helps inform the application of the
Lemon-Larson test. Taken together, the cases illustrate the high
bar that government policies must clear when they single out a
specific protected group. Significant government interests alone,
as shown in Hassan, will not make a policy valid, nor will policies
that allow room for stereotypes and prejudice to sneak in. Nevertheless, tailored policies that discriminate against a particular
class but address specific, compelling government interests when
no alternative is available can be constitutional, as demonstrated
by the search policy in Tabbaa.
C.

Applying the Lemon-Larson Test

To demonstrate the Lemon-Larson test’s applicability to
religious-questioning policies, this Section applies it to various
factual scenarios. In practice, this test respects both compelling
governmental interests and deep wariness about any government
entanglement with religion. This Section first applies the test to
the policies at issue in Isakhanova and Cherri, both of which
would be considered unconstitutional. It then explores similar
Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a ‘constitutional nor[m],’ not an ‘anomaly.’”).
176 City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 467, 521 (Scalia concurring) (noting that
racial classification can also be appropriate when used to remedy past discrimination).
177 United States v Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir 2000), quoting J.A.
Croson Co, 488 US at 493.
178 208 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2000).
179 Id at 1135.
180 Id.

222

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:193

hypothetical religious-questioning scenarios to demonstrate the
nuances of Lemon-Larson that would not be provided by either
test alone.181
1. Isakhanova fails the Lemon-Larson test at Step One.
Had the district court applied the Lemon-Larson test to the
religious-questioning policy in Isakhanova, the analysis would
have been straightforward and the result predictable. There
seems to be little question that the policy should be considered
unconstitutional under Step One. Recall that the prison guards
in Isakhanova paired religious questions (“Do you pray five times
a day?”) with facially disparaging comments (“All Muslims are
terrorists”). It would be difficult for the prison to argue that this
policy was driven by a compelling government interest. As shown
in cases like Hassan, broad claims about general governmental
interests like “national security” without “objective evidence” do
not pass muster as a compelling government interest.182 In
Isakhanova, the government did not even present such a broad
claim. It “offered no explanation” of how the religious questions
related to the prison guard’s investigation of alleged tobacco
smuggling.183
Even if the defendants had raised some potentially compelling
interest, such as the security of the prison, the religious questioning would still fail under Step One. Not only is this broad justification not grounded in “objective evidence,” but the questions are
not narrowly tailored to this end. The derogatory comments
certainly added nothing to potential fact gathering by the prison
guard, and strongly suggest that religiously motivated humiliation or offense, rather than gathering evidence, was the purpose
of the questioning. The Government’s best defense in Isakhanova
would be to try to argue that the guard’s comments were one-off
and not an official policy; if true, this might protect the government from liability.184

181 These hypotheticals all concern American citizens, thereby avoiding the different
legal framework triggered when noncitizens are involved.
182 Hassan, 804 F3d at 306–07.
183 Isakhanova, 2016 WL 1640649 at *6.
184 See Town of Greece, 134 S Ct at 1824.
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2. Cherri fails the Lemon-Larson test at Step Three.
While the questioning in Cherri would also fail the LemonLarson test, this analysis is much closer and the policy likely fails
only once the effects test is balanced against the government’s interest in Step Three. This is because the government’s interest—
protecting national security—was much more apparent in Cherri
than in Isakhanova. As the court put it, the government’s interest
in controlling who is allowed into the country is “at its zenith at
the international border.”185
The crux of Step One of the Lemon-Larson analysis for Cherri
is determining whether the questioning was sufficiently narrowly
tailored. The nature of the questioning appears to be much more
similar to the invalid surveillance in Hassan (when an entire
community was surveilled based on generalized concerns) than
the valid stops in Tabbaa (when the Muslim plaintiffs were subjected to standard searches based on specific intelligence about a
conference they chose to attend).186 In Cherri, individuals passing
through a border checkpoint were stopped for no reason other
than their ethnicity and apparent religion and asked questions
that are not part of a general security stop, including “How many
times a day do you pray?” and “Which mosque do you go to?”187
The plaintiffs also alleged that CBP agents at other ports of entry
posed questions including “Are there any extremists or terrorists
at the mosque?” and “Do you know Anwar al-Awlaki [a known
terrorist]?”188 Asking such an array of questions to individuals
who happen to be affiliated with a specific religion does not
appear narrowly tailored or grounded in “objective evidence.”189
Rather, this questioning seems to be grounded in “common sense”
that is “inflected by stereotypes.”190 As such, it leaves open the
“possibility” that the questioning is driven by “illegitimate . . .
prejudice or stereotype.”191 As with the impermissible stops in
Montero-Camargo, the Cherri questions suggest that, because of
185 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 931–32, citing United States v Flores-Montano, 541 US
149, 152 (2004).
186 Compare Hassan, 804 F3d at 306, with Tabbaa, 509 F3d at 95.
187 Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 924.
188 Id at 926.
189 See ISPU American Muslim Poll Key Findings *1–2 (Institute for Social Policy and
Understanding, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/24X3-H7PN; National Survey of American Muslims Finds Mosques Help Muslims Integrate into American Political Life *1–2
(Muslim American Survey, Mar 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/J4CL-3BFY.
190 Hassan, 804 F3d at 306.
191 Montero-Camargo, 208 F3d at 1134.
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their religion, these plaintiffs were “assumed to be potential criminals first and individuals second.”192
Still, it is likely that a court would find the Cherri questioning
constitutional under the Step One strict scrutiny test. Courts are
“sensitive” to the security needs of border agents.193 Border agents
are generally allowed broad discretion to profile individuals as
they work to protect national security.194 Given the deference
shown to border agents, it is likely that, in practice, a court would
not closely scrutinize the rationale of the government’s national
security justification at the border.195
But the analysis would not end there. The Cherri case would
move to the effects test at Step Two. As discussed in Part I.A.1,
the effects test asks what a well-informed reasonable observer
would understand the effects of the government policy to be.
Benchmarks for unconstitutional remarks come from Capistrano:
the description of creationism as “religious, superstitious nonsense” was invalid, but the Mark Twain “con man” quote was
valid.196 The Cherri questions ought to be found to be invalid, just
as the “superstitious” comment was. The offensiveness of the
Cherri questions, however, is more implicit than in the explicitly
offensive Capistrano comments. The border agents did not directly slander Islam.
Instead, they used Islam as a proxy to ascertain whether the
individual being questioned was a national security risk. A
reasonable observer might see this as a justifiable motive.
Regardless of whether the motive was proper, the questions still
conflate the practice of Islam with terrorism. This communicates
a message of disapproval toward Islam that a reasonable observer
would find at least as offensive as referring to creationism as
“superstitious nonsense,” even if the offense is not as immediately
apparent.
This reasonable observer can be pieced together using social
science research, rather than conjecture, as appeared to happen in

192

Id at 1135.
Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 926.
194 See Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State
and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 Ariz L Rev 113, 133–34
(2007). See also Deborah A. Ramirez, Jennifer Hoopes, and Tara Lai Quinlan, Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post–September 11 World, 40 Am Crim L Rev 1195, 1209 (2003).
195 See Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306, 351–53 (2003) (Thomas concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (clarifying that national security is one of very few bases that
constitutes a compelling government interest that can justify racial discrimination).
196 Capistrano, 615 F Supp 2d at 1146.
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the actual Cherri and Isakhanova cases. Significant research has
shown that individuals and the government in post–September 11
America have internalized the perceived connection between
Islam and terrorism.197 This would be particularly true for the reasonable observer in 2017. Such an individual would be generally
familiar with the fact that the president of the United States had
called during his candidacy for a “total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States” based on concerns about
“horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad, and
have no sense of reason or respect for human life”; had stated that
“Islam hates us”; and had suggested that Christian refugees
should be given priority over Muslim ones at America’s shores.198
The well-informed reasonable observer in modern America understands the perceived connection between Islam and terrorism.
Questions centered on Islam, especially in the context of an
interrogation by a government official tasked with protecting
American security, express disapproval by sanctioning this negative stereotype of the religion. Furthermore, this was not a oneoff comment by a visiting minister, as in Town of Greece.199 This
was a formal policy put into place by government officials who
determined that the way to gauge whether an individual is a risk
is to know the extent to which he follows Islam.200 Given the scope
of the policy and the reasonable observer’s awareness of recent
American history, the religious questioning would be understood
to “denigrate” a religion by equating its followers with security
threats.201
Because the Cherri policy fails the Step Two effects test, it
would be presumptively invalid. It fails to overcome that presumption at Step Three. Here, the strongly negative effects balanced
against the borderline validity under strict scrutiny would render
the Cherri questioning unconstitutional. The Cherri policy barely

197 See Amjad Mahmood Khan, Religious Freedom as a National Security Imperative:
A New Paradigm (Harvard National Security J, Mar 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/
E36W-PFKP (discussing how current US government strategies “overemphasiz[e] a
terrorism-focused analysis of Islam”). See also Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the
Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years after 9/11, 13 NY City L Rev 33,
37–38 (2009).
198 See International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 857 F3d 554, 594 (listing
times when President Trump “expressed anti-Muslim sentiment”); Burke, Trump Says US
Will Prioritize Christian Refugees (cited in note 2).
199 See Town of Greece, 134 S Ct at 1824.
200 See Cherri, 951 F Supp 2d at 924–25.
201 See Town of Greece, 134 S Ct at 1824.
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passes strict scrutiny: it does because the government has a compelling interest in protecting national security, with additional
discretion at the border. The policy still suffers from a lack of a
concrete connection between the questions asked and that interest, and from a failure to narrowly tailor the questioning. Asserting
the “gravity of [a] threat alone” does not justify an otherwiseunjustifiable government policy.202 Compared with barely passing
under strict scrutiny, the Cherri policy certainly fails Step Two;
it expresses animus toward Islam by using Islamic observance as
a factor indicating a national security threat. The policy therefore
fails: the balancing test at Step Three presumptively finds a policy invalid if it fails Step Two. Because this policy barely passed
Step One, it does not overcome that presumption.
The Government would have a few potential defenses against
finding the Cherri policy unconstitutional. For one, a court has to
weigh the presumption of invalidity under Lemon-Larson against
the deference afforded the government at the border, where its
power is at its “zenith.” Given this deference, the Government
could argue that a court should treat the Cherri policy just as the
Second Circuit treated the search policy in Tabbaa.203 That court
relied on the CBP’s “extensive expertise in securing the border”
and deferred to the agency’s decision that the “routine procedures”
were called for.204 These “routine procedures” included targeting
attendees at an Islamic conference for searches, fingerprinting,
questioning, and photographing.205 The Tabbaa plaintiffs (who
did not raise Establishment Clause claims)206 were not questioned
about their religious beliefs, but the Government could posit that
the connection between their religion and the searches was just
as clear as in Cherri. The searches in Tabbaa were potentially
more intrusive, at least physically, than the questioning in
Cherri. These facts weigh in favor of the same outcome in each
case. Such arguments have some merit, but ultimately they fail.
The Government in Tabbaa claimed that it had received specific
intelligence about potential danger from attendees of the conference at issue,207 and the searches performed, while extensive, were
tailored to determining whether the searched individuals posed a
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See text accompanying notes 171–74.
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threat. The questions asked of the Cherri plaintiffs did not fulfill
the same purpose as running a fingerprint or searching a car for
dangerous items.
Finding the Cherri policy unconstitutional under LemonLarson demonstrates that the test remains consistent with the
theory underpinning Lemon. Lemon does not employ a balancing
test or engage with strict scrutiny because it prohibits all excessive government entanglement with religion. The Lemon-Larson
test gives the government some breathing room for situations in
which religion truly does implicate government interests. If the
Larson step consistently outweighed the effects test, however,
that would reduce the Lemon-Larson test to the Larson test. The
Cherri policy signals clear, strong government disapproval of
Islam, impermissible under Lemon. Its validity under Step One
strict scrutiny is a close call. The fact that the policy may be appropriate under Larson, therefore, is not enough to render it valid
at Step Three.
3. Other factual scenarios demonstrate the Lemon-Larson
test’s fit for religious-questioning cases.
The Lemon-Larson test can be applied to a broader set of
potential fact patterns than those in Cherri and Isakhanova, both
of which similarly concern a law enforcement official questioning
individuals who have done nothing to raise suspicions about their
Islamic beliefs. Hypothetical fact patterns (loosely based on true
events) further demonstrate that Lemon-Larson is well suited to
analyzing the unique concerns raised in religious-questioning
cases.
There are some fact patterns that can be decided easily under
the Lemon-Larson test. These demonstrate that Lemon-Larson
does not disrupt existing jurisprudence surrounding longstanding
US practices; it creates a way to accommodate new ones. The census, for instance, is still constitutional under both Step One and
Step Two of Lemon-Larson (meaning no Step Three balancing is
required). The government collects information on citizens’ selfdescribed religious identification through the American Religious
Identification Survey (“ARIS”).208 The government interest here is
208 See Section 75. Self-Described Religious Identification of Adult Population (US
Census Bureau, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/XC6V-BMAV. The Census Bureau itself does not inquire into the religion of citizens, but it incorporates the findings of the
privately operated ARIS into the Statistical Abstract of the United States. About ARIS
(ARIS), archived at http://perma.cc/235L-DEW5.
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clear and unobjectionable (to gather demographic information)209
and the question is tailored to the specific piece of information the
government wants as closely as it could be. There is no reason to
believe that a reasonable observer would understand a general
question about religious affiliation to disapprove of, or endorse,
religion.
The questioning in Vernon210 would likewise still be constitutional. Under Step One, the government’s purpose was clear
(making sure an assistant police chief was not breaking the law)211
and the investigation was narrowly tailored to precisely the behavior that had called into question Vernon’s ability to faithfully
execute his job. Moving on to Step Two, a reasonable observer
would understand that the questioning was driven by Vernon’s
own conflation of his religious beliefs with his responsibilities as
a police officer, and not by disapproval of his sect of Christianity.
Hypothetical religious-questioning scenarios demonstrate
the Lemon-Larson test would not allow law enforcement officers
to invoke religion by alleging “compelling interests” that were
clearly pretextual. An example of an obviously unconstitutional
religious-questioning policy would be police wandering around
Borough Park in New York City while investigating a child-abuse
scandal involving the Hasidic Jewish community,212 stopping
passersby who appear to be Hasidic Jews, and asking them “Why
would you believe in such an outdated religion?” and “Why would
you be a part of a religion that covers up child abuse?” The government might claim that, as in Vernon, the police are attempting
to solve a crime. However, the insulting questions are ill fitted to
finding the perpetrator of the crime. The individuals being questioned have demonstrated no connection between their potentially criminal actions and their religion, and there is presumably
no “objective evidence” to prove a connection between the interest
and the questions. This policy would fail at Step One.
The Lemon-Larson test allows for a nuanced, informative
analysis in situations in which religious questions may actually
uncover helpful information and the policy has a facially legitimate, reasonable government purpose. One difficult and close,

209

See Lewis, 806 F3d at 357.
See text accompanying notes 99–102.
211 See Schall, 467 US at 264 (emphasizing crime prevention as an undoubtedly compelling state interest).
212 See Lucy Westcott, Newsweek Article on Alleged Hasidic Child Abuse Sparks
Brooklyn Yeshiva Protest (Newsweek, Mar 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2S59-XUL8.
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but ultimately constitutional, fact pattern would be if the police
gain intelligence that members of the Kingston Group, a radical
religious sect holding fundamentalist Mormon beliefs in Salt
Lake City, Utah, are engaging in polygamy and making forced
marriage arrangements via letters.213 The government wants to
figure out who is engaged in this scheme, but members of the
Kingston Group wear “conventional clothing” with no obvious
markers.214 With no other clues to go on other than the group’s
stated religious beliefs, postal workers at area post offices are
instructed to discreetly pull aside everyone who they believe to be
Mormon and ask them questions including “Do you believe in
polygamy?”; “Do you know anyone in the Kingston family?”; and
“Why are you Mormon?” Starting at Step One, the government
has a compelling interest in stopping crime. The questions are
also more narrowly tailored than Hassan or Cherri. As in Tabbaa,
the government is attempting to target members of a specific community engaged in a specific flagged activity (mailing letters).
The activity is legal (as is attending an international conference),
but the government has reason to believe it is being used to facilitate a crime. The similarities between this situation and Tabbaa
suggest the policy passes strict scrutiny.
Though it passes Step One, this policy fails Step Two. This
failure turns on how much a hypothetical reasonable observer
knows. The Kingston Group has no affiliation with the mainstream Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS), which disavowed
polygamy long ago.215 It is a small splinter group, and the questions are trying to target individuals affiliated with that group.
For an individual well versed in this background, these questions
would pass Step Two. They are not disapproving of the practices
of Mormonism, but instead trying to weed out members of a group
that is breaking the law. There is no research, however, on what
proportion of the population has heard of the Kingston Group and
its radical beliefs. For this reason, assume the reasonable observer has not heard of this small group. A reasonable observer
who has general knowledge about the history of polygamy, the
Mormon Church, and American disapproval of polygamy—but

213 See Nate Carlisle and Brian Maffly, Federal Agents Raid Utah Offices of Polygamous
Kingston Group (Salt Lake Trib, Feb 10, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/E8JT-33Y4.
214 Id.
215 For a (colorful) description of the alleged criminal activities of the Kingston Group and
its differences from the LDS Church, see Jesse Hyde, Inside “The Order,” One Mormon Cult’s
Secret Empire (Rolling Stone, June 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/KE2M-M82D.
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not about the splinter Kingston Group—might miss the nuance of
the questioning. No matter the government’s actual motives, the
focus on Mormons in attempting to investigate the forcedmarriage scheme could very well be seen as claiming that it is
Mormons, rather than members of the Kingston Group, who
engage in illegal, forced polygamy. This would treat Mormons as
“second-class citizens” and disapprove of the religion.216
Because it fails at Step Two, the policy moves on to—and
passes—Step Three. While the policy clearly passes Step One
strict scrutiny, it only narrowly fails Step Two. Its failure at
Step Two is also mitigated by the fact that a reasonable observer
in Salt Lake City, where the Kingston Group is based and where
it presumably has increased notoriety, would more likely be
familiar with the group and understand the true thrust of the
questions than a random American. Overall, it is a relatively narrow policy, which attempts to implicate religion only insofar as it
relates to solving a specific crime. Some questions, such as “Why
are you Mormon?”, may not be tailored as narrowly as possible. It
is unlikely this question will be answered with “To engage in
forced polygamy!” It appears plausible, though, for the government to argue that its questions are truly trying to root out followers of the Kingston Group. Assuming the police have evidence
of the criminal activities of the Kingston Group but no way to
uncover its members other than through this type of individual
interrogation, then these questions are plausibly among those
most able to narrow the population down to members of the
Kingston Group who may be engaged in the criminal enterprise.
The policy is not perfect, but courts are deferential (within limits,
as shown by Hassan) to stated government interests when they
are supported with more than superficial evidence.
A hypothetical, revised Cherri policy presents another
challenging application of the Lemon-Larson test. Consider the
following: The Cherri policy is found unconstitutional, and the
government hopes to conform with the law by making the questions religiously neutral with a “Cherri-plus” policy. Border
agents are now charged with asking questions including “Do you
consider yourself religious?”; “How often do you attend a house of
worship?”; and “Are there any religious zealots or extremists of
which you are aware at your house of worship?” If the answers

216 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v City & County of San Francisco,
624 F3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir 2010).
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suggest that the individual is devout and the border agent feels
something is amiss, the agents have more particular questions to
ask that are tailored to specific religious practices. Agents have
discretion over which people to question, but have been directed
that Arab Muslims and people with pro-life bumper stickers (who
the officials see as representing a threat to people at clinics that
offer abortions)217 should be of particular interest. With the
Cherri-plus policy, the government has diluted its focus on Islam
and attempted to use facially neutral questions that invoke religion but only appear to call the legitimacy of specific religious
practices into question once the agent believes red flags are raised
by the screening questions.
Under Lemon-Larson, the Cherri-plus policy would still be
unconstitutional. The core problem with this type of questioning,
hard to overcome in any permutation of the policy, is that it
equates an individual’s religion with a threat—without specific
reason to do so. It invokes religion when the individual being
questioned has not given the government a reason to think his
religious beliefs pose a threat. Even though the new policy overtly
takes the focus off of Islam, it impermissibly treats devotion to
religion of any kind as an incriminating characteristic; this line of
questioning is worse than what occurred in Cherri because it continues to treat Islam as a threat but sweeps more religions into
the umbrella of beliefs that trigger the government’s scrutiny.
Therefore, rather than becoming more acceptable by incorporating more religions, the Cherri-plus policy is actually more
concerning under Lemon-Larson than Cherri was. There are two
potential reasons for the expansion of the policy: the government
thinks that devoted individuals of other creeds are also a threat
or it is asking those questions to diffuse the focus on Islam. If the
former, the policy is invalid at Step One. Under the logic of Larson
and Hassan, the government cannot, for example, cite a “security”
interest in questioning pro-life Christians without presenting an
“actual concrete problem.”218 This policy sweeps an entire community of innocent individuals into questioning that imprecisely
probes a poorly defined threat. The questions are also poorly tailored—most pro-life Christians pose no threat to abortion clinics,
and the questions are too vague to efficiently identify those few
who might.
217 See Jerry Newcombe, Can Your Pro-life Bumper Sticker Actually Get You in Trouble?
(Christian Post, Sept 27, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2LZQ-KLNH.
218 Awad, 670 F3d at 1129.

232

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:193

On the other hand, if the government is merely asking these
questions to make it appear that the focus is not on Islam, then
the Cherri-plus policy also fails the Lemon-Larson test. Under
Step One, rather than being narrowly tailored to an “actual concrete problem,” this policy would just obfuscate the true purpose
of questioning Muslims. This purpose can be understood in classic
Lemon terms—the stated purpose of a policy cannot be a pretextual “sham,” covering up the actual intent to disapprove of or
endorse a religion.219
If the Cherri-plus policy moved on to Step Two despite the lack
of narrow tailoring, a court would consider the policy’s effects. The
government in this hypothetical considers religion a key factor in
determining whether an individual poses a threat. This certainly
impermissibly “communicat[es] a message” of disapproval to religion.220 An altered Cherri-plus policy is unconstitutional under
Lemon-Larson, whether the government genuinely crafted it to
target several religions viewed by the government as risks or
whether the government meant to obscure the true target of Islam.
D. Why to Apply the Lemon-Larson Test
This Comment proposes applying a novel test to religiousquestioning cases under the Establishment Clause because existing tests fail to adequately address the concerns raised in these
cases. The application of Lemon-Larson to Cherri, Isakhanova,
and the other scenarios described in Part III.C demonstrates how
the Lemon-Larson test accommodates both the unique role of
religion in American society (captured by the Lemon test) and the
unique concerns raised when the government truly has a compelling reason to become entangled in religion (captured by the
Larson test). The test does so without requiring a wholesale
invention of a new test that would disrupt Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
The Court’s Establishment Clause tests are incapable of
adequately analyzing religious questioning. One could argue the
opposite, pointing to the use of these tests in analogous cases like
Capistrano that consider disparaging remarks toward religion.221
It is true that disparaging remarks are similar in form to religious
219
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questioning. However, they do not implicate similarly forceful
government interests, such as the national security interests
raised by policies like the one in Cherri. For that reason, Lemon
is inadequate to handle the asserted compelling interests in
religious-questioning cases. Lemon invalidates policies that violate any of its prongs. This provides no breathing room for the
government when religion truly implicates compelling interests.
Cases like Hassan and Tabbaa demonstrate that courts are
generally willing to provide governments with this breathing
room in other spaces. The facts in Cherri are a good example of
this shortcoming. While Cherri is unconstitutional under LemonLarson, the test compels a court to grapple with the national
security interests claimed by the government even though the
policy communicates a message of disapproval toward a religion.
Lemon cannot accommodate a compelling government interest
that entangles religion in the same way. On the other hand,
Larson alone cannot address these concerns. The Larson test does
not incorporate concerns about religious liberty in the same way
as the other Establishment Clause tests—a possible reason for its
rare invocation by the courts. Larson suffers from the same shortcomings as the strict scrutiny tests applied in the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA contexts.222 In addition, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny only to those Establishment Clause cases that
concern policies that “patently” discriminate among religions.223
Although religious questioning may implicate discrimination
among religions, it does not necessarily do so. The Larson test, as
a stand-alone test, should not be applied to these policies: the
Court created it to apply to a specific subset of cases and did not
tailor it to assess the validity of religious policies more broadly.
The Lemon-Larson test succeeds in analyzing religiousquestioning policies when either test on its own would come up
short. The applications of the Lemon-Larson test to the fact
patterns from Part III.C demonstrate how the Lemon-Larson test
shores up Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Utah post
office example demonstrates the way the Lemon-Larson test can
offer greater flexibility for government policies that become
entangled with religion if the entanglement is for demonstrably
compelling reasons. Yet the Cherri and the Cherri-plus examples
show that flexibility does not come at the expense of longstanding
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Establishment Clause values embedded in Lemon. The Larson
test would render Cherri and parts of the Cherri-plus policy
constitutional, but the Lemon-Larson test invalidates them. In
this way, the Lemon-Larson test sets a higher bar for government
policies that implicate religion than strict scrutiny, remaining
faithful to historic Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In essence, the two tests complement each other. Under
Lemon, courts invalidate a policy if it does not have a secular
purpose or if it has the effect of endorsing or disapproving of a
religion.224 The compelling-interest balancing that is at the core of
Larson strict scrutiny225 addresses Lemon’s primary shortcoming
by allowing the government to adopt religious-questioning policies when truly called for. It provides courts with more flexibility
without sacrificing the rigorous analysis required whenever a
government policy implicates religion. At the same time, the
Lemon-Larson test does not abandon Lemon’s values; it just uses
Larson to tailor the inquiry. Step Two ensures that religious
questioning is not merely subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Courts will still presume it is invalid if it fails the effects test in
Step Two. This enhanced analysis successfully addresses the
shortcomings from which either test applied alone suffers, making it the proper test to apply to religious questioning.
Adopting the Lemon-Larson test is also preferable to creating
an entirely new test for religious-questioning policies. There are
benefits to this latter option. An entirely new test could be
completely tailored to religious questioning, free of the baggage of
previous analyses and tangled jurisprudence. There are several
reasons not to take this step. The primary one is that religious
questioning, while unique, is still analogous to other Establishment
Clause cases. The Lemon-Larson test can benefit from related,
existing case law rather than require an entirely new set of
decisions to flesh out its proper application.
Furthermore, Lemon-Larson will likely be less controversial
to adopt than a wholly new test. Courts already frequently use
multiple Establishment Clause tests in their opinions.226 The
Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe227 may not
have explicitly adopted a new Establishment Clause test when it
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considered student-led prayers before football games,228 but it was
willing to tweak its existing tests to work with the facts at hand.
The opinion mentions Lemon only in its final paragraphs.229 The
core of the discussion centers on related concerns, including endorsement, the coercion inherent in school–student relationships,
and the difference between private and government speech, but
does not confront these issues explicitly using the Lemon steps.230
The Court appeared to think that this type of discussion was more
helpful in determining the validity of the policy considered in
Santa Fe Independent School District than a Lemon approach,
which silos each step. Van Orden is another example of the Court
adapting its existing analyses when considering new manifestations of Establishment Clause cases.231 It took a more dramatic
approach than Santa Fe Independent School District; the Court
thought Lemon itself did not need to be applied because of the
different concerns triggered by the historical dimensions of the
statue.232 The Lemon principles still motivated the decision, though.
The Court’s ultimate decision focused on the “dual significance”—
both religious and governmental—of the statue (reflecting the
search for a secular purpose) and that the plaintiff “walked by the
monument for a number of years” before finding it upsetting (suggesting the monument did not have an invalid effect on him).233
Another case in which the Court stepped outside of the traditional
Establishment Clause framework is Zelman v Simmons-Harris.234
The Court did not think the Lemon test necessary in its discussion
of whether the school voucher program at issue violated the
Establishment Clause.235 It found more helpful a close analysis of
the difference between government programs that directly provide
aid to religious schools and those that offer “true private choice.”236
Its analysis did remain motivated by the Lemon principles.237 Both
Lemon and Larson are already Supreme Court–promulgated
Establishment Clause tests. This Comment merely proposes

228 See id at 314 (“[W]e assess the constitutionality of an enactment by reference to
the three factors first articulated in Lemon.”).
229 See id.
230 See id at 302–16.
231 See Van Orden, 545 US at 686.
232 Id at 685–86.
233 Id at 691–92.
234 536 US 639 (2002).
235 See generally id.
236 Id at 649.
237 See id 668–69 (O’Connor concurring).
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adapting them to a new manifestation of Establishment Clause
question. As with statues of historical significance and programs
promoting school choice, religious-questioning policies raise unique
concerns that merit unique attention within Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
Finally, Larson fits naturally into the Lemon framework.
Lemon’s first prong already looks at the purpose behind a government policy. Larson is also interested in the purposes of a policy.
As compared to Lemon, which automatically invalidates a policy
once it becomes overly entangled with religion, strict scrutiny
allows for a more nuanced look at the narrowness and legitimacy
of that purpose. The strict scrutiny framework provides the additional tools to assess the constitutionality of government purposes
that necessarily implicate religion. It does so without requiring
courts to significantly change the way that they approach
Establishment Clause questions. The Lemon-Larson test will not
clash with existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence; it seeks
to take advantage of the way that Larson complements the Lemon
test’s ability to navigate the role of religion in American society
by offering a preexisting framework through which to measure
the importance of a governmental interest.
CONCLUSION
Religious questioning by government officials implicates, but
has yet to be fully analyzed under, the Establishment Clause.
President Trump’s recent emphasis on refugees’ religions shows
the need to understand how this type of policy—which invokes
religion but in meaningfully different ways than traditional
Establishment Clause cases—should be treated under the
Establishment Clause. This Comment addresses that gap in the
literature. Traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
created to accommodate the unique relationship between the
American government and religion, is best applied to this type of
case through a modified analysis, the Lemon-Larson test. This
test pairs the traditional Establishment Clause inquiry with a
strict scrutiny analysis that allows for some government entanglement with religion when that entanglement is truly driven by
compelling government interests. This hybrid test would conclude
that most types of religious questioning, including the policies in
Cherri and Isakhanova, violate the Establishment Clause. At the
same time, it affords the government breathing room to implicate
religion when truly called for. By tailoring existing Establishment

2018]

A Borderline Case

237

Clause analyses to the concerns raised by religious-questioning
policies, the Lemon-Larson test allows for a thorough Establishment
Clause analysis of a new form of government entanglement with
religion.

